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Abstract
The standard two-sector monetary business cycle model suffers from an important defi-
ciency. Since durable good prices are more flexible than non-durable good prices, optimising
households build up the stock of durable goods at low cost after a monetary contraction.
Consequently, sectoral outputs move in opposite directions. This paper finds that labour
market frictions help to understand the so-called sectoral “comovement puzzle”. Our bench-
mark model with staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining closely matches the empirical
elasticities of output, employment and hours per worker across sectors. The model with
Nash bargaining, in contrast, predicts that firms adjust employment exclusively along the
extensive margin.
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1 Introduction
The seminal work of Barsky, House & Kimball (2007) demonstrates that a two-sector mone-
tary business cycle model with Walrasian labour markets suffers from an important deficiency.
Based on the microeconometric evidence provided by Bils & Klenow (2004) and Klenow &
Kryvtsov (2008), the authors assume that prices of non-durable goods and services change only
infrequently, while durable good prices are perfectly flexible. Consequently, after a monetary
contraction, durable good prices fall stronger than non-durable good prices. The asymmetric
price dynamics incentivise the representative household to build up the stock of durable goods
and to reduce the consumption of non-durable goods. For this reason, the model predicts that
sectoral outputs move in opposite directions, which implies that monetary policy shocks are
close to neutral for aggregate output. This outcome is clearly at odds with the data.
We show that labour market frictions help to understand the so-called sectoral “comovement
puzzle”. Optimising households increase durable good expenditure only if durable good prices
fall sharply. As durable good prices are perfectly flexible, this requires that real marginal costs
in the durable sector are sufficiently elastic. In other words, the model with Walrasian labour
markets fails to generate sectoral comovement because real marginal costs in the durable sector
are too elastic (Carlstrom & Fuerst 2010). In this paper, we argue that labour market frictions
are able to reduce the elasticity of real marginal costs along two dimensions. First, through
the presence of job search and matching frictions (Pissarides 2000). Second, by the impact
of staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining (Christoffel & Kuester 2008) — a sequential
bargaining protocol where nominal wages are negotiated before firms may choose the number of
hours per worker unilaterally.
The introduction of job search and matching frictions is motivated by the results from a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. Our SVAR documents that a contractionary
monetary policy shock causes a persistent economic downturn across the entire economy. In both
sectors, output, employment and hours per worker fall significantly. In contrast to the previous
literature, our model with job search and matching frictions is able to address the decline in
labour input along both margins explicitly. Furthermore, we confirm the finding of Erceg &
Levin (2006) that, in the durable sector, output and employment respond much stronger —
although the durable good price index falls sharper than the price index of non-durable goods
and services. Rather, the high sensitivity of the durable sector is driven by the longevity of
durable goods (Bils, Klenow & Malin 2012). Since durable goods depreciate only slowly, current
purchases constitute only a small proportion of the aggregate stock. This explains why the
durable sector accounts for more than 50% of the variance in aggregate labour input, but only
for less than 20% of all employees.
Our benchmark model with staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining is able (i) to gen-
erate positive comovement between the durable and the non-durable sector, (ii) to replicate the
high elasticity of durable output relative to non-durable output and (iii) to match the empirical
pattern of labour adjustment along the extensive and intensive margins after a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Right-to-Manage wage bargaining (Trigari 2006) establishes a direct
link between the nominal wage rate and the real marginal cost. For this reason, any sticki-
ness in nominal wages directly reduces the elasticity of real marginal costs (the so-called “wage
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channel”, see Christoffel & Kuester 2008). Thus, staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining is
able to generate a large contraction in durable production even at a moderate degree of nominal
wage stickiness, in line with the empirical evidence documented by Gottschalk (2005).
Moreover, we investigate the impact of the specific wage bargaining protocol, the impor-
tance of labour mobility across sectors and the role of hiring firms’ profits for the quantitative
performance of our model. First, when nominal wages are set by Nash (1953) bargaining, the
model successfully generates sectoral comovement — even if nominal wages are fully flexible.
However, the model version with Nash bargaining predicts that firms adjust labour input exclu-
sively along the extensive margin. Second, we find that our model generates sufficient stickiness
in durable real marginal costs only if job searchers are mobile across sectors.1 In this case, the
non-arbitrage condition for vacancy creation equalises real marginal costs in both sectors. Con-
sequently, stickiness originating in the non-durable sector may be transmitted to the durable
sector. Third, we show that the elasticity of employment depends on the elasticity of hiring
firms’ profits. Thus, when hiring firms’ are small, any given monetary policy shock is “lever-
aged” into large employment fluctuations.2 Otherwise, as hiring firms may set the number of
hours per worker unilaterally, Right-to-Manage wage bargaining gives rise to excessive labour
adjustment along the intensive margin. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion by
Christoffel & Kuester (2008) in a one-sector monetary business cycle model.
In recent years, the sectoral comovement puzzle has sparked a large number of investigations3.
However, to our knowledge, no study has yet examined the impact of job search and matching
frictions in this context. Building on Iacoviello (2005), Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello & Neri (2010)
and Sterk (2010) show that the introduction of collateral constraints reduces the households’
ability to smooth consumption. Bouakez, Cardia & Ruge-Murcia (2009, 2011) assert that non-
durable (durable) goods account for almost 50% (about 10%) of the material input expenditure
by the durable (non-durable) sector. Therefore, they introduce an input-output structure that
syncronises economic activity across sectors. Carlstrom & Fuerst (2010) evaluate the impact
of nominal wage stickiness in a two-sector version of the model by Erceg, Henderson & Levin
(2000). Yet, the model is unable to replicate the long-lived decline in durable production unless
two additional modifications (i.e.; output adjustment costs in durable goods as well as habit
formation in non-durable consumption goods and services from durable goods) are considered.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section (2) provides empirical evidence
on the cross-sectoral effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock. Section (3) presents the
model environment. Section (4) calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance.
Section (5) concludes.
1This assumption seems reasonable, given the high degree of inter-industry mobility of workers in the U.S. —
as documented by Kambourov & Manovskii (2008) and Herz & van Rens (2011).
2A similar argument was made by Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) in a search economy subject to technology
shocks.
3Further contributions include Kitamura & Takamura (2008) who consider a model with sticky information;
Katayama & Kim (2010) who evaluate the impact of non-separable preferences; Tsai (2010) who studies a model
with working capital and habit formation; DiCecio (2009) develops a medium-scale DSGE models with nominal
wage stickiness; and Levin & Yun (2011) who analyse a model with preference shocks to leisure and incomplete
financial markets.
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2 Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence on the cross-sectoral effects of a contractionary mon-
etary policy shock. We estimate a SVAR model using the identification scheme developed by
Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1996). The following variables are included in the infor-
mation set: the growth rate in the relative price of durable goods, ∆pd,t, the relative hourly
wage of workers in the durable sector, ωd,t, the inflation rate in the non-durable sector, pic,t,
the employment rate in the non-durable sector, nc,t, the employment rate in the durable sector,
nd,t, hours per worker in the non-durable sector, hc,t, hours per worker in the durable sector,
hd,t, output per capita in the non-durable sector, yc,t, output per capita in the durable sector,
yd,t and the Federal Funds rate, Rt. Our sample period covers US data between 1964Q1 and
2007Q4.4 Precise definitions can be found in the Appendix (Tables 1 and 2).
2.1 Identification & Estimation
We consider the following reduced-form VAR:
xt = a+B(L)xt−1 + et,
xt =
[
zt Rt
]′
,
zt =
[
∆pd,t ωd,t pic,t nc,t nd,t hc,t hd,t yc,t yd,t
]′
,
where B(L) is a lag polynomial of orderM . By premultiplying with β0, we obtain the structural
VAR:
β0xt = α+ β(L)xt−1 + t,
where t denotes the vector of fundamental shocks. The orthogonality assumption implies that
its covariance matrix V = E(′tt) is diagonal. Moreover, we normalise the diagonal of β0 to a
10x1 vector of ones. When estimating the SVAR, we also include constant terms and a linear
trend. Following the AIC rule (with Mmax = 6), the VAR order is set to M = 3.5
Our identification strategy is based on short-run restrictions. In particular, we impose that
the Fed’s information set includes the contemporaneous values of all other variables in our SVAR
(Christiano et al. 1996). This assumption implies that no other variable may respond contempo-
raneously to an unexpected change in the Federal Funds rate. Consequently, the process for the
Federal Funds rate depends on the current and past values of all other variables, but no other
process depends on its current realisations. Hence, the last column of the contemporaneous
coefficient matrix β0 consists of zeros, apart from the last element which is normalised to unity.
The order of the variables included in the vector zt imposes a number of additional short-run
restrictions.
4The endpoint of our sample marks the start of the Great Recession when the Federal Reserve adopted several
unconventional monetary policy measures, which are unlikely to be appropriately captured by our identification
procedure.
5None of our results are sensitive to the specific estimation strategy.
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2.2 Results
Figure (1) illustrates the Cholesky orthogonalised impulse responses to an unexpected increase
in the Federal Funds rate. We examine a one-standard-deviation shock at horizons up to 16
quarters. The blue solid line is the point estimate. The red dashed lines represent the associated
two-standard-deviation confidence interval. In line with our identifying assumptions, the impact
of the monetary policy shock is temporary. After the initial increase, we find that the Federal
Funds rate remains above its steady state level for about six quarters. In response to the hike
in the nominal interest rate, we notice a delayed but persistent decline in the inflation rate of
non-durable prices (Sims 1992).
Our SVAR documents that a contractionary monetary policy shock causes a persistent eco-
nomic downturn across the entire economy. In both sectors, output and labour input fall signif-
icantly. In particular, we find that labour input contracts along the extensive and the intensive
margin. Furthermore, we confirm the result of Erceg & Levin (2006) that, in the durable sector,
output and employment respond significantly stronger — output by factor six and employment
by factor three6 — although the durable good price index falls sharper than the price index of
non-durable goods and services. Rather, the high sensitivity of the durable sector is driven by
the longevity of durable goods (Bils et al. 2012). Since durable goods depreciate only slowly,
current purchases constitute only a small proportion of the aggregate stock. This explains why
the durable sector accounts for more than 50% of the variance in aggregate labour input, but
only for less than 20% of all employees. Besides, we note that the relative wage of workers in
the durable sector remains virtually unchanged.
3 The Model
We introduce labour search and matching frictions into a two-sector monetary business cycle
model akin to Barsky et al. (2007). Individual household members derive utility from a composite
consumption good and leisure. The composite consumption good is defined as an aggregate of
non-durable consumption goods and the flow of services from the stock of durable goods. Both
non-durable consumption and durable expenditure are CES aggregates of differentiated goods.
These goods are produced by sector-specific monopolistically competitive good firms, facing
Calvo (1983) type restrictions at the retail level. The factor market for labour services, instead,
is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Labour services are provided by sector-specific hiring
firms searching for workers on frictional labour markets. The nominal wage rate is determined by
staggered Right-to-Manage bargaining Christoffel & Kuester (2008). This sequential bargaining
protocol assumes that the nominal wage rate is negotiated before the hiring firm may choose
the number of hours per worker unilaterally (Trigari 2006).
3.1 The Labour Market
At the beginning of period t, the share ut of the labour force (which is normalised to unity)
searches for employment opportunities in both sectors. Along with them, there is an infinite
6For the reader’s convenience, the scale of all variables concerning the durable sector is multiplied by factor
three.
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mass of sector-specific hiring firms with unfilled positions. Each hiring firm can hire at most
one worker. Hiring firms with an unfilled position may decide whether or not to post a vacancy,
where posting a vacancy entails a cost. Let vc,t and vd,t denote the number of vacancies that are
posted by hiring firms in the non-durable (c) and durable (d) sectors respectively. The number
of newly formed firm-worker pairs is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant
returns to scale. The matching function relates aggregate job matches mt to the number of
aggregate vacancies vt = vc,t + vd,t and the number of job searchers ut in the labour market:
m (vt, ut) = m¯vξtu
1−ξ
t ,
where ξ denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to aggregate vacancies and
m¯s is the efficiency of the matching process. By linear homogeneity of the matching function,
the aggregate job finding rate p(θt) and the aggregate vacancy filling rate q(θt) depend only on
the value of aggregate labour market tightness (θt = vt/ut):
p(θt) =
mt
ut
= θt
mt
vt
= θtq(θt).
Note that the tighter the aggregate labour market, the longer the expected time to fill a vacancy,
but the shorter the expected time searching for a job (and vice versa). We assume that job
searchers are randomly matched with vacancies of either kind. Hence, the aggregate job finding
rate equals the sum of the sectoral job finding rates:
p(θt) =
mt
ut
(
vc,t
vt
)
+ mt
ut
(
vd,t
vt
)
= p(θc,t) + p(θd,t),
where θs,t = vs,t/ut is the sector-specific measure of labour market tightness. Furthermore,
given free entry into the labour market, random matching entails that the vacancy filling rate
is equalised across sectors:
q (θs,t) =
vs,t
vt
m (vt, ut)
vs,t
= q (θt) .
Following Ravenna & Walsh (2008) and Blanchard & Gali (2010), we impose that new
matches become immediately productive.7 Moreover, at the end of period t, a constant share ρs
(s = {c, d}) of pre-existing employment relationships is terminated.8 The evolution of sectoral
employment ns,t is therefore governed by:
ns,t =
vs,t
vt
m (vt, ut) + (1− ρs)ns,t−1. (1)
7As demonstrated by Thomas & Zanetti (2009), it is reasonable to assume instantaneous matching in models
that are calibrated to a quarterly frequency.
8As shown by Shimer (2012), Fujita & Ramey (2009) and Hertweck & Sigrist (2012) most of the cyclical
variation in employment in the U.S. is due to job creation rather than job separation. Thus, for simplicity, we
assume that all separations are exogenous.
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Accordingly, the number of job searchers at the beginning of period t equals the share of indi-
viduals who did not have a job in the previous period, 1 − nc,t−1 − nd,t−1, minus the flow of
workers who have just lost their job, ρcnc,t−1 + ρdnd,t−1:
ut = 1− (1− ρc)nc,t−1 − (1− ρd)nd,t−1. (2)
3.2 Households
There is a large number of identical households with unit measure, each of which consists of
a continuum of individuals. The members of the representative household are either employed
by sector-specific hiring firms or search for a job in the labour market. The expected life-time
utility of an individual household member j can be represented by:
Hjs,t = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(Cjτ )1−σ − 11− σ − χs
(
hjs,τ
)1+%s
1 + %s
 = Et ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tIjs,τ ,
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on period t information, β ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor, Cjt is the composite consumption good, σ is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution, χs is the utility cost parameter in sector-specific labour supply, hjs,t is
the number of hours worked by an employed individual j in sector s and %s denotes the labour
supply elasticity along the intensive margin of individuals employed in sector s. The period
utility of an individual household member j is summarised by Ijs,t.
3.2.1 The Composite Consumption Good
The composite consumption good consists of a CES aggregate of non-durable consumption
goods, cjt and the flow of services from the stock of durable goods, d
j
t :
Cjt =
(
cjt
)ζ (
djt
)1−ζ
,
where ζ is the steady-state share of non-durable consumption.9 In the limit, when σ goes to 1,
the period utility of an individual household member j, Ijs,t, becomes separable in non-durable
consumption, the flow of durable services and sectoral hours:
Ijs,t = ζ ln cjt + (1− ζ) ln djt − IN
χs
(
hjs,t
)1+%s
1 + %s
 ,
where IN is an indicator function equal to zero if the individual household member j is unem-
ployed and otherwise equal to one.
9The results of our paper remain unchanged when durable and non-durable goods are assumed to be comple-
ments. Only in the extreme case when durable and non-durable goods are near-Leontief, the model of Barsky
et al. (2007) is able to generate comovement across sectors. Such a high degree of complementarity, however,
cannot be found in the data (Bernanke 1984).
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Non-durable consumption is a CES aggregate of differentiated non-durable goods:
cjt =
[∫ 1
0
(
cjit
)1−1/c
di
]1/(1−1/c)
, (3)
where c > 1 denotes the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution among individual varieties of
non-durable goods cjit . Given that P ic,t denotes the nominal price of the non-durable good i,
expenditure minimisation implies that its relative demand is given as:
cjit =
(
P ic,t
Pc,t
)−c
cjt . (4)
By integrating equation (4) and imposing (3), we obtain the associated price index of non-durable
consumption:
Pc,t =
[∫ 1
0
(
P ic,t
)1−c
di
]1/(1−c)
.
Newly acquired durable goods, xjt , are represented by a CES aggregate of differentiated
new durable goods:
xjt =
[∫ 1
0
(
xjit
)1−1/d
di
]1/(1−1/d)
, (5)
where d > 1 denotes the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution among varieties of new durable
goods xjit . The law of motion for the aggregate stock of durable goods is given by:
xjt = d
j
t − (1− δ) djt−1, (6)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate of the stock of durable goods. Given that P id,t denotes the
nominal price of the durable good i, expenditure minimisation implies that the relative demand
for the durable-good variety xjit is given as:
xjit =
(
P id,t
Pd,t
)−d
xjt . (7)
By integrating equation (7) and imposing (5), we obtain the associated price index of newly
acquired durable goods:
Pd,t =
[∫ 1
0
(
P id,t
)1−d
di
]1/(1−d)
.
3.2.2 Evolution of Sectoral Employment
From the perspective of the representative household, aggregate employment in sector s evolves
according to:
ns,t = (1− ρs)ns,t−1 + θs,tq (θs,t)ut for s = {c, d} , (8)
where the sectoral job finding rate, θs,tq (θt), is exogenous to the household’s decision problem.
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3.2.3 Budget Constraint
Following Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), we assume that employed and unemployed house-
hold members insure each other completely against idiosyncratic income risk from unemploy-
ment. Thus, the nominal budget constraint of the representative household reads as:
Pc,tct+Pd,txt+Bt = Rt−1Bt−1+
∑
s={c,d}
[∫ ns,t
0
W js,th
j
s,tdj + Φs,t
]
+(1− nc,t − nd,t)Pc,tb¯−T¯t. (9)
Employed household members earn the nominal sector-specific wage rate W js,t per working hour
hjs,t, while the share of unemployed household members, (1 − nc,t − nd,t), receives nominal
unemployment benefits Pc,tb¯. The lump-sum transfer Tt imposed by the government finances
unemployment benefits and rebates any seigniorage revenue to the representative household
(see Section 3.6). Nominal risk-free government bonds, Bt, pay a nominal interest rate, Rt, in
period t+1. Moreover, the representative household receives lump-sum dividends, Φc,t and Φd,t,
remitted by retail and hiring firms in both sectors.
3.2.4 First Order Conditions
The representative household maximises the unweighted expected life-time utilities of its indi-
vidual household members,
∫ 1
0 Hjs,tdj, subject to the evolution of sectoral employment (8), the
budget constraint (9), a set of initial conditions for the state variables {d0, ns,0, Ws,0} and a
stochastic time path for Rt. The representative household takes all aggregate variables as given.
Therefore, the choices with respect to ct, Bt and dt have to satisfy the following first order
conditions:
λt = ζ
C1−σt
ct
, (10)
1
Rt
= βEt
λt+1
λt
Pc,t
Pc,t+1
, (11)
λtϕd,t =
(1− ζ) C1−σt
dt
+ β (1− δ)Etλt+1ϕd,t+1, (12)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (9) and ϕd,t = Pd,t/Pc,t
is the (real) price of durable goods relative to the price of non-durable goods. We define gross
inflation in sector s as pis,t = Ps,t/Ps,t−1. The first order conditions describe the marginal utility
of the composite consumption good (equation 10), the standard Euler equation for government
bonds (equation 11) and the asset pricing equation for durable goods (equation 12). By forward
iteration of equation (12), we can express the relative price of durable goods as the present
discounted value of future rents generated by services from the stock of durable goods.
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3.2.5 The Net Marginal Value of Employment
The net marginal value of employment to the representative household is given by:
Ws,t
(
W js,t
)
=
W js,t
Pc,t
hjs,t −
b+ χs
λt
(
hjs,t
)1+%s
1 + %s
+ (13)
+β (1− ρs)Etλt+1
λt
{
ϑ˜sWs,t+1
(
W js,t
)
+
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
Ws,t+1
(
W ∗s,t+1
)}
−βEt
λt+1λt
∑
l={c,d}
(1− ρl) q (θt+1) θlt+1
[
ϑ˜lWlt+1 (Wlt) +
(
1− ϑ˜l
)
Wlt+1
(
W ∗lt+1
)] .
If an unemployed household member finds a job in sector s, the net income of the representative
household increases, but the marginal worker suffers disutility from working time (first line of
equation 13). In addition, the household gains the continuation value of employment at that
firm (second line), minus the opportunity cost of searching for a job and finding it elsewhere
(third line). We also note that both new and ongoing matches are subject to staggered wage
contracts with Calvo (1983) probability ϑ˜s. Workers in ongoing matches that are unable to
renegotiate in period t + 1 receive the same nominal wage rate as in the previous period; i.e.,
W js,t. Workers in new matches that are unable to bargain receive the average nominal wage rate
prevailing at time t in the respective sector10; i.e., Wlt.
3.3 Final Good Producers - Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], in both
sectors of the model economy. Each retailer produces a distinct final good variety, yis,t, according
to the following linear production technology:
yis,t = y¯is,t,
with labour services y¯is,t as the only factor of production. We assume that final good firms rent
labour services from hiring firms on a perfectly competitive factor market.
In the non-durable retail market, final good firms face Calvo (1983) type restrictions in
price setting. At the beginning of period t, only a fraction 1 − ϑc of final good firms is able
to re-optimise the price of its variety i. All non-durable producers that are able to re-optimise
prices choose the same retail price, P ∗c,t, given that they all face the same real marginal cost of
production. Non-durable producers that cannot re-optimise keep their prices unchanged. This
specification implies that the log-linearised New Keynesian Phillips curve in the non-durable
sector is given by:
pˆic,t = Et [βpˆic,t+1] +
(1− βϑc)(1− ϑc)
ϑc
ϕˆmc,t, (14)
where the hat, xˆt, denotes the log-deviation of variable xt from its non-stochastic steady state
at time t.
10See also Section (3.5)
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In the durable retail market, on the contrary, prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible.
Thus, profit maximising durable producers set their prices, P id,t, as a constant mark-up over real
marginal cost, Pmd,t:
P id,t =
d
d − 1P
m
d,t. (15)
Furthermore, we note that the ratio of durable inflation to non-durable inflation equals the
period change in the relative price of durable goods:
ϕd,t
ϕd,t−1
=
pipd,t
pipc,t
. (16)
3.4 Hiring Firms
There is a continuum of potential hiring firms on the unit interval j ∈ [0, 1], that provide
specialised labour services to final good producers. Each hiring firm can employ at most one
worker j. Hiring firms with unfilled positions may decide whether or not to open a sector-specific
vacancy, vs,t, where posting a vacancy entails a cost κs. Therefore, the hiring firm can expect to
gain the average value of a filled position Js,t with probability q (θt). With probability 1− q (θt)
the vacancy remains unfilled. Furthermore, we assume that a newly matched firm-worker pair
in sector s is only able to renegotiate the nominal wage contract W ∗s,t with probability
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
.
Otherwise, the firm-worker pair simply adopts the average nominal wage rate prevailing at t−1,
Ws,t−1. Thus, the value of an unfilled vacancy, Vs,t, is given as:
Vs,t = −κs + q (θt)
[
ϑ˜sJs,t (Ws,t−1) +
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
Js,t
(
W ∗s,t
)]
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
[1− q (θt)]Vs,t+1.
Free entry into both sectoral matching markets ensures that the outside option of hiring
firms is zero in each period, Vsτ = 0 ∀ τ ≥ t. Hence, the non-arbitrage condition for vacancy
creation is given by:
κs = q (θt)
[
ϑ˜sJs,t (Ws,t−1) +
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
Js,t
(
W ∗s,t
)]
. (17)
Hiring firms with filled positions have access to a strictly concave and twice differentiable
production function:
y¯js,t =
(
hjs,t
)αs
,
where y¯js,t is the quantity of specialised labour services, h
j
t is the number of hours worked by
individual j and αs < 1 is the production elasticity of working hours. At the sectoral level, the
quantity of specialised labour services in period t is given by:
y¯s,t = ns,thαss,t =
∫ ns,t
0
(
hjs,t
)αs
dj =
∫ 1
0
y¯is,tdi, (18)
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where ns,t denotes the number of filled positions in sector s. Labour services produced by hiring
firm j, y¯js,t, are rented to final good firms at the competitive price ϕms,t. Hence, real per-period
profits of hiring firm j are given by:
φjs,t = ϕms,t
(
hjs,t
)αs − hjs,t (W js,t/Pc,t)− µs,
where W js,t/Pc,t is the real hourly wage paid by firm j in sector s and µs is the sector-specific
non-labour cost of production11. Thus, the value of employment for firm j in sector s is equal
to
Js,t
(
W js,t
)
= φjs,t + βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− ρs)
[
ϑ˜sJs,t+1
(
W js,t+1
)
+
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
Js,t+1
(
W ∗s,t+1
)]
, (19)
where the second term denotes the expected continuation value of employment for the firm
— conditional on surviving exogenous job destruction at the end of period t. In particular,
the expected continuation value reflects the fact that nominal wages are subject to staggered
contracts with a constant renegotiation probability of 1− ϑ˜s.
3.5 Wage Determination
Frictions in the labour market and decreasing-returns-to-scale at the hiring firm level create
economic rents between matched firm-worker pairs. These rents are shared by wage bargaining.
Following Andolfatto (1996), the representative household takes the labour supply decision for
all its members. In particular, we assume that the household bargains with each employer
separately, while taking wages in all other matches as given (Pissarides 2000, Chapter 3).
The nominal wage rate is determined by Right-to-Manage wage bargaining.12 This bargain-
ing protocol presumes the following sequential setting. First, the two parties agree on a nominal
wage rate per hour, W js,t, according to the Nash rule. Second, the hiring firm may choose uni-
laterally the number of hours per worker, hjs,t. Therefore, the hiring firm sets the number of
hours per worker so as to maximise its surplus share:
W js,t
Pc,t
= ϕmt αs
(
hjs,t
)αs−1
. (20)
Equation (20) states that, in each sector, the real wage rate, W js,t/Pc,t, must be equal to the real
marginal revenue product per hour worked. As a result, the real wage rate is allocative for the
number of hours per worker, hjs,t. This establishes a direct link (the so-called “wage channel”
Christoffel & Kuester 2008) between the real marginal cost, ϕmt , and the real wage rate.
11Note that the sector-specific non-labour cost is paid per worker. Thus, at the aggregate level, non-labour
costs are proportional to the current employment level. Non-labour costs therefore represent variable production
costs that are independent of the actual number of hours per worker. For instance, these costs include overhead
costs like administrative services or health insurance costs (Christoffel & Kuester 2008).
12Section (4.3.1) evaluates the model under Nash (1953) bargaining.
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In other words, the hiring firm has full bargaining power in stage two. As both parties
are fully rational, they internalise the way hours per worker are set when bargaining over the
nominal wage rate in stage one. Backward induction implies that the Nash rule is now given by:
γJ ∗s,t
∂Wjs,t
∂W js,t
∣∣∣∣∣
∗
W ∗s,t = (1− γ)W∗s,t
∂J js,t
∂W js,t
∣∣∣∣∣
∗
W ∗s,t, (21)
where asterisks denote the optimal choice of real hourly wages and the optimal choice of hours
associated with these wages. The parameter γs denotes the time-invariant “nominal” bargaining
power of the representative household in sector s. The sectoral “effective” bargaining power,
however, is a time-varying variable:
γ∗s,t =
γsη
w
s,t
γsηws,t + (1− γs)ηfs,t
, (22)
where ηws,t is the marginal benefit of a change in the nominal wage rate to the representative
household:
ηws,t =
∂Wjs,t
∂W js,t
∣∣∣∣∣
∗
W ∗s,t = f1t − f2t, where (23)
f1s,t =
w∗s,th∗s,t
1− αs
χs
λt
(
h∗s,t
)%s
w∗s,t
+ βϑ˜s (1− ρs)Etλt+1
λt
(
w∗s,t+1pic,t+1
w∗s,t
) 1+%s
1−αs
f1s,t+1 and (24)
f2s,t = αs
w∗s,th∗s,t
1− αs + βϑ˜s (1− ρs)Et
λt+1
λt
(
w∗s,t+1pic,t+1
w∗s,t
) αs
1−αs
f2s,t+1 (25)
and ηfs,t is the marginal benefit of a change in the nominal wage rate to the firm:
ηfs,t = −
∂J js,t
∂W js,t
∣∣∣∣∣
∗
W ∗s,t = w∗s,th∗s,t + (1− ρs)βϑ˜sEt
λt+1
λt
(
w∗s,t+1pic,t+1
w∗s,t
) αs
1−αs
ηfs,t+1. (26)
Furthermore, we assume that both new and ongoing matches are subject to staggered nominal
wage contracts with Calvo (1983) probability ϑ˜s. Hence, the average sectoral nominal wage
evolves according to:13
Ws,t = ϑ˜sWs,t−1 +
(
1− ϑ˜s
)
W ∗s,t. (27)
13Haefke, Sonntag & van Rens (2009) as well as Petrongolo & Pissarides (2008) document that the elasticity
of wages in new matches is higher than the elasticity of wages in ongoing matches. Under Right-to-Manage
wage bargaining (our preferred specification, see below), however, the dynamics of the model remain essentially
unchanged when we consider a lower stickiness parameter for new matches.
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3.6 Government and Monetary Authority
The government finances unemployment benefits b¯, issues bonds Bt that pay a nominal interest
rate Rt in period t + 1 and rebates any seigniorage revenue to the representative household.
Each period, the budget balance is maintained by imposing a lump-sum tax T¯ :
T¯t +Bt −Rt−1Bt−1 = (1− nc,t − nd,t) b¯Pc,t.
When setting the nominal interest rate, the monetary authority obeys a generalised Taylor
(1993) rule as suggested by Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1999).
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)µr [(pic,t
pic
)rp (yt
y
)ry]1−µr
εrt with εrt ∼ i.i.d., (28)
where µr ∈ [0, 1) governs the degree of monetary policy inertia. The parameters rp ∈ [0,∞)
and ry ∈ [0,∞) control the responsiveness of the monetary authority to temporary shifts in
non-durable price inflation, pic,t,14 and aggregate output, yt. The latter is defined as the sum of
non-durable goods and durable goods in terms of non-durable prices: yt = ct+ϕd,txt. Moreover,
letters without a time subscript refer to the steady state value of the associated variable.
3.7 Market Clearing
We assume that vacancy posting costs, κsvs,t and the non-labour cost of production at the hiring
firm level, µsns,t, are bundled in both sectors using the same technology as the non-durable CES
aggregator.15 Hence the sectoral resource constraints can be written as:
yc,t = ct + κcvc,t + κdvd,t + µcnc,t + µdnd,t, (29)
yd,t = xt = dt − (1− δ) dt−1. (30)
3.8 Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of endogenous stationary processes, ys,t, yt, xt, λt,
ct, dt, ws,t, W∗s,t J ∗s,t, ηws,t, ηfs,t, ϕd,t, hs,t, ns,t, vs,t, ut, ϕms,t, Rt, pˆis,t and an exogenous process
{εrt}∞t=0 satisfying equation (1), (2), (6) and (10)-(30), given initial conditions for d−1, ns,−1,
R−1, ws,−1 and ϕd,−1.
4 Model Evaluation
The following section evaluates the quantitative performance of the model economy. We param-
eterise our benchmark model and examine the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Therefore, we log-linearise the model around the non-stochastic steady state and solve for the
recursive law of motion using Dynare 4.2.5 (Adjemian, Bastani, Juillard, Mihoubi, Perendia,
14All results remain essentially unchanged when the central bank targets wage inflation instead.
15All results are robust when the costs in each sector are cleared in terms of sector-specific output.
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Ratto & Villemot 2011). Furthermore, we discuss the role of the wage bargaining protocol, the
degree of labour mobility and the size of hiring firms’ profits.
4.1 Parameterisation
We assume zero steady-state inflation in both sectors. All structural parameters — except for
the degree of price stickiness — are chosen symmetrically across sectors. The time period of the
model corresponds to one quarter.16 Table (3) provides a summary of the key parameters.
Preferences All preference parameters are calibrated using conventional values. The discount
factor, β = 0.99, is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of four percent. Furthermore,
we assume logarithmic preferences in the composite consumption good (σ = 1), such that
within-period utility of the representative household is separable in non-durable consumption
and durable services (as in Barsky et al. 2007). The share of non-durable consumption in the
utility function, ζ = 0.76, implies that the steady-state share of non-durable production in
consumption is about 81%. The elasticity of substitution among sectoral varieties is set to
s = 11. This value is consistent with a steady-state value of sectoral mark-ups equal to 10%.
The labour supply elasticity along the intensive margin, %s, is calibrated to 2.8, which is within
the admissible range suggested by MaCurdy (1983) and Card (1994). The average number of
hours per worker, h¯s, is normalised to unity (Trigari 2006), which requires setting the utility
cost parameter in sector-specific labour supply, χs, equal to 0.79.
Production and Technology As documented by Fraumeni (1997), the service life of durable
goods owned by consumers ranges from three years (e.g. auto parts) to 40 years (e.g. residential
investment). Thus, we set the quarterly depreciation rate of durable goods equal to δ = 0.025,
corresponding to a mid-life of about ten years (Erceg & Levin 2006).
Firm-Worker Matches Given that the average number of hours per worker, h¯s, is normalised
to unity, we find a negative relationship between the sectoral production elasticity of working
hours, αs and sectoral non-labour costs, µs. Following Bouakez et al. (2011), we set µs = 0.54,
such that the labour input expenditure share, wshs/(wshs + µs) = 40%, is in line with US
industry data on input expenditure (Jorgenson & Stiroh 2000).17 The implied value of αc
is equal to 0.40. Importantly, we note that hiring firms’ profits are small under the current
parameterisation. As demonstrated by Christoffel & Kuester (2008) in a model with Right-to-
Manage wage bargaining, only if hiring firms’ profits are small, a given monetary policy shock
16When the model period is set to be one month, Right-to-Manage wage bargaining induces excessive labour
adjustment along the intensive margin. Therefore, we simulate the model at a quarterly frequency and impose
instantaneous matching in order to capture the fast US labour market dynamics.
17This value is clearly lower than the conventional value of about 66% reflecting the compensation of employees
in aggregate NIPA data. In our model, however, the labour input expenditure share represents the income share
of production workers excluding overhead costs. As surveyed by Christoffel & Kuester (2008), these overhead
costs may be substantial. For instance, Ramey (1991) documents that the share of non-production workers
in the manufacturing sector is about 30%. Basu (1996) finds even higher values. See also Footnote (18) and
Section (4.3.3).
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can be leveraged into large employment fluctuations.18 Otherwise, hiring firms tend to adjust
excessively along the intensive margin.
Moreover, we assume that both the “nominal” and the steady-state “effective” bargaining
power are symmetrically distributed; i.e., γs = γ∗s = 0.5. As explained by Consolo & Hertweck
(2010), this implies that, in the steady state, the real wage rate is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution (see equations 23 and 26). The value chosen for the labour supply elasticity along
the intensive margin ensures that this condition is satisfied.19
Search in the Labour Market Following Shimer (2012), we target an average unemployment
rate, 1 − nc,t − nd,t, equal to 6% and a steady-state job separation rate, ρs, equal to 10%
per quarter. Therefore, we set the sectoral hiring cost parameter to κs = 0.07, the efficiency
parameter in the matching function to m¯ = 0.95 and unemployment benefits to b¯ = 0.24. These
values imply that the ratio of vacancy posting costs to aggregate output is equal to 0.5% (as in
Cheron & Langot 2004). The total replacement ratio (i.e., the sum of unemployment benefits, b¯
and the value of the leisure surplus during unemployment, l¯, divided by the real wage) is equal
to 0.91.20 The average job finding rate of the measure of aggregate job searchers, ut = 0.15, is
equal to p(θ) = 0.61. Besides, we set the matching elasticity of vacancies, ξ, equal to 0.5. This
value is within the interval [0.3, 0.5] proposed by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001).
Price and Wage Stickiness Using the data set provided by Klenow & Kryvtsov (2008),
we find that the quarterly frequency of price changes for the median product category in non-
durable goods & services (here: automobile insurance) is equal to 1− ϑc = 0.30. On the other
hand, we find that about 70% of durable expenditure is due to housing, vehicles and personal
computers; i.e, very flexibly priced product categories. For instance, the quarterly frequency of
price changes for personal computers is equal to 94%. Therefore, as is standard in the literature
with durable production (see e.g. Iacoviello 2005, Sterk 2010), we set the Calvo parameter for
price stickiness in the non-durable sector, ϑc, equal to 0.7 and assume perfect price flexibility
in the durable sector; i.e., ϑd = 0. Importantly, we note that the “comovement puzzle” is
aggravated by the strong asymmetry in cross-sectoral price flexibility imposed by the current
parameterisation. Furthermore, according to the estimate of Gottschalk (2005), we set the
degree of nominal wage stickiness equal to ϑ˜s = 0.4 in both sectors. This value corresponds to
an average wage contract duration of about five months.21 The symmetric parameterisation of
wage stickiness across sectors is in line with the results of our SVAR model (see Section 2).
Monetary Policy Finally, the policy parameters of the generalised Taylor rule, µr = 0.8,
rp = 2.0 and ry = 0.3, are taken from Gertler, Sala & Trigari (2008).
18A similar argument was made by Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) in a search economy with Nash bargaining
subject to technology shocks. As a robustness check, Section (4.3.3) examines the model dynamics when µalts is
lowered to 0.28 such that the labour input expenditure share equals 68% and the implied value of αaltc is equal
to 0.65.
19Together with ξ = 0.5 (see below), the current parameterisation implies that the non-stochastic steady-state
of our model economy is efficient — independent of the wage bargaining protocol.
20See Footnote (18).
21As pointed out by Gottschalk (2005), the estimate may be biased by spurious statements. Thus, we also
evaluate the model when ϑ˜s set equal to 0.7 (corresponding to an average wage contract duration of ten months).
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4.2 The Dynamic Effects of a Monetary Policy Shock
The following section examines the dynamic effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Section (4.2.1) demonstrates that the elasticity of real marginal costs is key to understand the
monetary transmission mechanism in a two-sector business cycle model. Section (4.2.2) discusses
the impulse response functions under staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining.
4.2.1 The Role of Stickiness in Real Marginal Costs
The model generated monetary policy shock represents a temporary, but persistent hike in the
nominal interest rate. Given that prices of non-durable goods are sticky, the monetary contrac-
tion leads to a rise in the real interest rate via the standard Euler equation (11). Consequently,
the marginal utility of the composite consumption good, λt, rises. Furthermore, we note that
the depreciation rate, δ, is low and that the subjective discount factor, β, is close to unity. For
this reason, short-run fluctuations in durable expenditure have only little effect on the aggregate
stock of durable goods. As a result, the shadow value of durable goods; i.e., the right hand side
of the asset pricing equation, equation (12), remains essentially unchanged after a temporary
monetary contraction:
λtϕd,t ≈ C¯.
As demonstrated by Barsky et al. (2007), the “near constancy” property of the shadow value of
durable goods, C¯, implies that the rise in the marginal utility of consumption, λt, is accompanied
by a deep fall in the relative price of durable goods, ϕd,t. In particular, if the percentage decline
in the relative price of durable goods is greater than the percentage increase in the marginal
utility of the composite consumption good, the representative household has incentives to build
up the stock of durable goods, dt, at low costs.
This mechanism implies that households reduce durable expenditure only if the percentage
decline in the relative price of durable goods, ϕd,t is smaller than the percentage increase in
the marginal utility of consumption, λt. Since durable good prices are perfectly flexible, the
percentage decline in the relative price of durable goods is exactly identical to the percentage
decline of real marginal costs in the durable sector, ϕmd,t. When labour markets are frictionless,
as in Barsky et al. (2007), real marginal costs in both sectors are flexible. Thus, the standard
monetary business cycle model with Walrasian labour markets predicts that sectoral outputs
move in opposite direction. On the contrary, when real marginal costs in the durable sector are
inelastic, the relative price of durable goods falls only moderately. If this effect is sufficiently
strong, the representative household has incentives to lower durable expenditure. Thus, we
conclude that sectoral comovement requires that the real marginal cost in the durable sector is
sufficiently inelastic (see also Carlstrom & Fuerst 2010).
In our model environment, real marginal costs in both sectors, ϕms,t, behave exactly identical
to the relative price of durable goods, ϕd,t. This result stems from the fact that (i) durable prices
are perfectly flexible, which allows durable producers to set prices equal to marginal costs and
(ii) job searchers are perfectly mobile, which equalises real marginal costs across sectors. More
precisely, hiring firms in the durable (non-durable) sector increase (decrease) the number of
open vacancies until the non-arbitrage condition is satisfied. This cross-sectoral spillover effect
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reduces the elasticity of real marginal costs in the durable sector and increases the elasticity
of real marginal costs in the non-durable sector, until the response of real marginal costs is
symmetric in both sectors (see also Section 4.3.2).
In summary, the potential of our model to reduce the elasticity of real marginal cost arises
from two sources. First, through the presence of job search and matching frictions (Pissarides
2000). Second, by the impact of staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining (Christoffel &
Kuester 2008). Furthermore, some stickiness originating in the non-durable sector may affect
real marginal costs in the durable sector via cross-sectoral spillovers. In the following, we analyse
whether these effects are sufficiently strong such that sectoral outputs move in the same direction.
4.2.2 Right-to-Manage Bargaining
Figure (2) illustrates the impulse responses under Right-to-Manage wage bargaining. This bar-
gaining protocol imposes that the hiring firm and the representative household first bargain over
the nominal wage rate (which may be subject to staggered wage contracts). Second, hiring firms
choose the number of hours per worker unilaterally (Trigari 2006). Importantly, hiring firms
take the real wage rate — which was already fixed in the preceding bargaining step — as given
when choosing the profit-maximising number of hours per worker. Thus, Right-to-Manage wage
bargaining establishes a direct link between the nominal wage rate and the real marginal cost;
i.e., the so-called “wage channel” (Christoffel & Kuester 2008).
The red dashed line represents the impulse responses of our benchmark model, i.e; nominal
wages are subject to staggered contracts with Calvo parameter ϑ˜s = 0.4. Our benchmark model
comes close to replicating the pattern observed in the data. First, the model is able to generate
sectoral comovement. Second, the model closely matches the high elasticity of output and
employment in the durable sector relative to the non-durable sector — output by factor six and
employment by factor five. Third, in each sector, the elasticity of average working hours22 is
clearly lower than the elasticity of employment.23
On the contrary, when nominal wages are negotiated period-by-period, the model is less
successful in replicating the empirical pattern. Both durable output and employment display
a U-shaped decline, but the impact effect is positive (represented by the blue solid line in
Figure 2). Only if nominal wages are sticky (represented by the red dashed and green dotted
line), the model is able to generate marked negative responses in both sectors. The stronger the
degree of wage stickiness, the larger are the elasticities of output and employment in the durable
sector. The mechanism behind the observed pattern is the following. On the one hand, stickiness
in nominal wages, Ws,t, reduces the elasticity of real marginal costs, ϕms,t, in both sectors (see
equation 20). On the other hand, perfect mobility of job searchers entails that some stickiness
originating in the non-durable sector spills over to the durable sector. For this reason, both real
marginal costs in the durable sector, ϕmd,t, and the relative price of durable goods, ϕd,t, become
22Staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining gives rise to dispersion in the number of hours per worker.
Strictly speaking, the impulse response function depicted in Figure (2) shows the number of hours per worker
associated with the average nominal wage rate.
23As all sectoral parameters are chosen symmetrically and job searchers are assumed to be randomly matched
with hiring firms from both sectors, the response of working hours is identical in both sectors.
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less elastic when nominal wages are subject to staggered wage contracts. As a result, households
lose the incentive to build up the stock of durable goods after a monetary contraction.
In order to understand the response of hours per worker, it seems advantageous to rewrite
equation (20) as follows:
hjs,t =
(
αsϕ
m
t Pc,t
W js,t
) 1
1−αs
. (31)
Accordingly, any reduction in sectoral real marginal costs, ϕms,t, is accompanied by a decline in
the real wage rate, W js,t/Pc,t and/or the amount of hours per worker, h
j
s,t. Thus, the higher
the degree of nominal wage stickiness, the sharper the drop in the number of hours per worker.
In particular, we observe that only our benchmark model, which adopts a moderate degree of
nominal wage stickiness (Gottschalk 2005), is able to replicate the dynamics of labour adjustment
along the extensive and intensive margin. When nominal wages change less frequently, the model
predicts that the elasticity of hours per worker in the non-durable sector is of the same magnitude
as the elasticity of employment. The latter result is not consistent with the empirical evidence.
The reason why our benchmark model exhibits such a strong “wage channel” is the sequen-
tial bargaining setting. In the first stage, the representative household anticipates the lack of
influence on working hours. The anticipation effect strengthens its “effective” bargaining power,
γ∗s,t, during the wage bargaining process, which induces additional stickiness in the real wage
rate (Consolo & Hertweck 2010). The resulting low elasticity of the real wage rate gives firms
in both sectors strong incentives to adjust labour mainly along the intensive margin.
4.3 Discussion
The previous section has shown that the Right-to-Manage wage bargaining model with moderate
nominal wage stickiness (Gottschalk 2005) comes closest to matching the pattern observed in
the data. The current section analyses the impact of the following three assumptions. First,
we investigate sensitivity to the wage bargaining protocol. Therefore, we evaluate the model
dynamics under Nash (1953) bargaining. When nominal wages are bargained period-by-period,
this model version allows us to quantify the impact of job search and matching frictions in
comparison to the model of Barsky et al. (2007). Second, we study the effects of labour mobility
for the cross-sectoral transmission of stickiness in real marginal costs. Third, we examine the
role of hiring firms’ profits for the amplification of employment fluctuations.
4.3.1 Nash Bargaining
Model Environment In contrast to Right-to-Manage wage bargaining, Nash bargaining as-
sumes that the nominal wage rate and the number of hours per worker are chosen simultaneously
in order to maximise the weighted product of each party’s surplus share:
max
W js,t,h
j
s,t
[
Ws,t
(
W js,t
)]γs [Js,t (W js,t)]1−γs ,
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where γs is the bargaining power of the household in sector s. Thus, the first order conditions
with respect to W ∗s,t and hs,t are:
γJs,t
(
W ∗s,t
)
= (1− γ)Ws,t
(
W ∗s,t
)
(32)
and
ϕms,tαsh
αs−1
s,t =
χsh
%s
t
λt
. (33)
Equation (33) shows that hours per worker are set such that the real marginal revenue product
of labour (left hand side) equals the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour (MRS, right hand side). This rule maximises each party’s surplus share and, therefore,
is made by mutual agreement. Therefore, the dynamics of real marginal costs are determined
by the cyclical behaviour of the MRS — and not by the nominal wage rate. The nominal wage
rate only divides the joint surplus into two shares, but has no impact on its size. This explains
why the model with Nash bargaining lacks a direct “wage channel”. For this reason, staggered
nominal wage contracts can affect the dynamics of real marginal costs only indirectly through
the vacancy posting decision.
To find the stationary competitive equilibrium under Nash bargaining we substitute equa-
tions (20)-(21) for (32)-(33) and we remove the set of equations (23)-(26). We parameterise this
model version such that its non-stochastic steady state is identical to our benchmark model. As
mentioned above, this parameterisation implies that hiring firms’ profits are small.
Impulse Response Analysis Figure (3) illustrates the impulse responses to a contractionary
monetary policy shock when nominal wages are determined by Nash bargaining. We observe that
the model successfully generates sectoral comovement — even if nominal wages are negotiated
period-by-period. This result indicates that the introduction of job search and matching frictions
helps the model to solve the “comovement puzzle”. In particular, the costly and time-consuming
search for workers in the labour market and the existence of long-run employment relationships
lead to a reduction in the elasticity of real marginal costs.
As a result, real marginal costs in both sectors are now less elastic than in the model with
frictionless labour markets (Barsky et al. 2007). The inelasticity of the real marginal cost
in the durable sector translates into sluggish dynamics of the relative price of durable goods.
Therefore, the representative household abstains from using durable goods as an investment
device to smooth aggregate consumption. However, we note that the effect is not sufficiently
strong to replicate the high elasticity of durable output and employment relative to the non-
durable sector.
When nominal wages are subject to staggered contracts,24 we observe that the model gener-
ates more elastic responses in durable output and employment. However, the model replicates
the high elasticity of durable output and employment relative to the non-durable sector only
if the Calvo parameter (ϑ˜s=0.7) is higher than observed in the data (Gottschalk 2005). As
24Note that, when labour market are frictional, nominal wage stickiness does not necessarily distort the em-
ployment formation/separation decision between a matched firm and a worker. As explained by Hall (2005), the
joint match surplus establishes a set of infinitely many equilibrium wages. Thus, as long as the wage rate lies
within the bargaining set, the Barro (1977) critique does not apply.
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explained above, nominal wage stickiness under Nash bargaining affects real marginal costs only
indirectly as it changes hiring firms’ incentives to adjust the number of vacancies. Thus, the
effects of nominal wage stickiness are limited. This finding is related to the “irrelevance” result
documented by Krause & Lubik (2007) who show that, when wages are determined by Nash
bargaining, real wage stickiness is almost irrelevant for inflation dynamics.
However, the most important deficiency of the model with Nash bargaining is that the model
generated response of working hours, hs,t, is very close to zero in both sectors. In the data, on
the contrary, labour input contracts significantly along both margins. Rewriting equation (33)
reveals that the zero response of working hours is due to the “near constant” shadow value of
durable goods:
C¯ ≈ ϕms,tλt =
χsh
%s
s,t
αsh
αs−1
s,t
.
In other words, working hours in both sectors are nearly constant because real marginal costs,
ϕms,t and the marginal utility of the composite consumption good, λt, move in opposite directions.
More precisely, as the rise in λt is marginally higher than the fall in ϕms,t, working hours even
display a slight increase.
4.3.2 Sector-Specific Labour Markets
The cross-sectoral spillover effect occurs through labour mobility between the two sectors. If job
searchers are perfectly mobile, as in the baseline version of our model, random matching with
vacancies of either kind entails that both types of hiring firms face the same vacancy filling rate.
This channel equalises real marginal costs across sectors and, thus, may transmit stickiness from
one sector to the other. In the following, we examine the potential of labour market frictions to
reduce the elasticity of real marginal costs in a two-sector monetary business cycle model.
Our benchmark model assumes that job searchers are randomly matched with hiring firms
from both sectors. This assumption seems reasonable, given the high degree of inter-industry
mobility of workers in the U.S. — as documented by Kambourov & Manovskii (2008) and Herz &
van Rens (2011). In order to highlight the importance of labour mobility, the current subsection
presents a model version where job searchers are immobile across sectors. More specifically, there
is a separate matching market for workers previously employed in the durable and non-durable
sector respectively. These job searchers can only be matched with hiring firms from the same
sector.25
Figure (4) compares the impulse responses of the current model specification with the bench-
mark model. In both model versions, nominal wages are subject to staggered Right-to-Manage
bargaining with Calvo parameter ϑ˜s = 0.4. When job searchers are immobile across sectors, the
non-arbitrage condition for vacancy creation is no longer satisfied. Therefore, the dynamic effects
of the vacancy filling rate are sector-specific. This modification eliminates the spillover effect
that equalises real marginal costs across sectors. Thus, compared to the benchmark model, the
elasticity of the real marginal cost rises in the durable sector, but falls in the non-durable sector.
This effect reduces the representative household’s incentives to decrease durable expenditure
25The non-stochastic steady state of this alternative model version is parameterised such that all sectoral
transition rates are symmetric.
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after a monetary contraction. Consequently, the sign of the impulse responses in the durable
sector remains negative, but the degree of stickiness in real marginal costs is not sufficient to
replicate the sharp fall in durable production.
This result indicates that labour mobility plays an important role in the transmission of
monetary policy shocks. Only if job searchers are mobile across sectors, stickiness originating
in the non-durable sector can spill over to the durable sector. This indirect channel makes the
real marginal cost in the durable sector sufficiently sticky in order to replicate the high elasticity
of durable production. Therefore, we conclude that the assumption of random matching seems
a good approximation.26 The shape of the impulse responses, however, is not sensitive to the
degree of labour mobility.
4.3.3 Alternative Parameterisation
The benchmark parameterisation presented in Section (4) calibrates the non-labour cost of
production, µs = 0.54, such that the steady state labour input expenditure share, wshs/(wshs+
µs), is equal to 40%, which is in line with U.S. industry data on input expenditure (Jorgenson
& Stiroh 2000). In the following, we examine the model dynamics when the non-labour cost of
production, µalts = 0.28, is set such that the labour input expenditure share is equal to 68%,
which is consistent with aggregate NIPA data from the BEA. The alternative calibration target
implies that the production elasticity of working hours rises from αs = 0.45 to αalts = 0.65. At
the same time, we adjust the vacancy posting cost parameter, κaltc = 0.46, such that the steady
state unemployment rate, 1− nc − nd = 6%, remains unchanged.
The value chosen for the non-labour cost of production is important, as it reduces the size
of hiring firms’ profits. Only when hiring firms’ profits are small, a given monetary policy shock
can be “leveraged” into large employment fluctuations (Christoffel & Kuester 2008). This effect
follows from the non-arbitrage condition for vacancy creation (equation 17), which establishes
a link between the elasticity of vacancies and the elasticity of hiring firms’ profits. Otherwise,
as hiring firms may set the number of hours per worker unilaterally, Right-to-Manage wage
bargaining gives rise to excessive labour adjustment along the intensive margin. The current
section quantifies this effect.
Figure (5) illustrates the impulse responses under the alternative parameterisation. We
observe that, under the alternative parameterisation, the elasticity of working hours is three
times larger than in our benchmark model. In addition, due to the assumption of perfect labour
mobility across sectors, the response of working hours is symmetric. As a result, hiring firms in
the non-durable sector tend to adjust labour input almost exclusively along the intensive margin.
This outcome is clearly at odds with the empirical evidence. For this reason, we conclude that
small profits of hiring firms improve the quantitative performance of our model. Qualitatively,
however, the model’s ability to generate comovement across sectors does not depend on the
specific parameterisation.
26Note that Bouakez et al. (2011) reach the opposite conclusion in a model with input-output interactions.
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5 Conclusion
The seminal work of Barsky et al. (2007) demonstrates that a two-sector monetary business cycle
model with Walrasian labour markets fails to replicate sectoral comovement after a monetary
contraction. Since durable goods prices are flexible, but their shadow value is “near constant”,
optimising households build up the stock of durable goods at low cost and reduce the consump-
tion of non-durable goods and services. Thus, the model predicts that sectoral outputs move in
opposite directions. This outcome is clearly at odds with the data.
We show that the model with Walrasian labour markets fails to generate sectoral comovement
because the real marginal cost in the durable sector is too elastic. In this paper, we argue
that labour market frictions are able to reduce the elasticity of real marginal costs along two
dimensions. First, through the presence of job search and matching frictions (Pissarides 2000).
Second, by the impact of staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining (Christoffel & Kuester
2008) - a sequential bargaining protocol where nominal wages are negotiated before firms may
choose the number of hours per worker unilaterally.
Our benchmark model with staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining is able (i) to gener-
ate positive comovement between the durable and the non-durable sector and (ii) to replicate the
high elasticity of durable output relative to non-durable output and (iii) to match the empirical
pattern of labour adjustment along the extensive and intensive margin after a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Right-to-Manage wage bargaining (Trigari 2006) establishes a direct
link between the nominal wage rate and the real marginal cost. For this reason, any sticki-
ness in nominal wages directly reduces the elasticity of real marginal costs (the so-called “wage
channel”, see Christoffel & Kuester 2008). Thus, staggered Right-to-Manage wage bargaining is
able to generate a large contraction in durable production even at a moderate degree of nominal
wage stickiness, in line with the empirical evidence documented by Gottschalk (2005).
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the specific wage bargaining protocol, the impor-
tance of labour mobility across sectors and the role of hiring firms’ profits for the quantitative
performance of our model. First, when nominal wages are set by Nash bargaining, the model
successfully generates sectoral comovement — even if nominal wages are fully flexible. How-
ever, the model version with Nash bargaining predicts that firms adjust labour input exclusively
along the extensive margins. Second, we find that our model generates sufficient stickiness in
the durable’s sector real marginal cost only if job searchers are mobile across sectors. Thus, the
non-arbitrage condition for vacancy creation equalises real marginal costs across sectors. Con-
sequently, stickiness originating in the non-durable sector may be transmitted to the durable
sector. Third, we show that the elasticity of employment depends on the elasticity of hiring
firms’ profits. Thus, when hiring firms’ are small, a given monetary policy shock is “leveraged”
into large employment fluctuations. Otherwise, as hiring firms may set the number of hours per
worker unilaterally, Right-to-Manage wage bargaining gives rise to excessive labour adjustment
along the intensive margin. The latter finding is equivalent to the conclusion by Christoffel &
Kuester (2008) in a one-sector monetary business cycle model.
22
References
Adjemian, S., Bastani, H., Juillard, M., Mihoubi, F., Perendia, G., Ratto, M. & Villemot, S.
(2011), Dynare: Reference Manual, Version 4, Dynare Working Papers No. 1, CEPREMAP.
Andolfatto, D. (1996), ‘Business cycles and labor-market search’, American Economic Review
86(1), 112–132.
Barro, R. (1977), ‘Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy’, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 3(3), 305–316.
Barsky, R. B., House, C. L. & Kimball, M. S. (2007), ‘Sticky-price models and durable goods’,
American Economic Review 97(3), 984–998.
Basu, S. (1996), ‘Procyclical productivity: Increasing returns or cyclical utilization?’, The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 111(3), 719–751.
Bernanke, B. S. (1984), ‘Permanent income, liquidity, and expenditure on automobiles: Evidence
from panel data’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99(3), 587–614.
Bils, M. & Klenow, P. J. (2004), ‘Some evidence on the importance of sticky prices’, Journal of
Political Economy 112(5), 947–985.
Bils, M., Klenow, P. J. & Malin, B. A. (2012), Testing for Keynesian demand, in ‘NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2012’, The University of Chicago Press. Forthcoming.
Blanchard, O. & Gali, J. (2010), ‘Labor markets and monetary policy: A New Keynesian model
with unemployment’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(2), 1–30.
Bouakez, H., Cardia, E. & Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2009), ‘The transmission of monetary policy in
a multisector economy’, International Economic Review 50(4), 1243–1266.
Bouakez, H., Cardia, E. & Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2011), ‘Durable goods, inter-sectoral linkages
and monetary policy’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35(5), 730–745.
Calvo, G. A. (1983), ‘Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework’, Journal of Monetary
Economics 12(3), 383–398.
Card, D. (1994), Intertemporal labor supply: An assessment, in C. Sims, ed., ‘Advances in
Econometrics: Sixth World Congress’, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, pp. 49–78.
Carlstrom, C. T. & Fuerst, T. S. (2010), ‘Nominal rigidities, residential investment, and adjust-
ment costs’, Macroeconomic Dynamics 14(1), 136–148.
Cheron, A. & Langot, F. (2004), ‘Labor market search and real business cycles: Reconciling
Nash bargaining with the real wage dynamics’, Review of Economic Dynamics 7(2), 476–493.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. & Evans, C. (1996), ‘The effects of monetary policy shocks:
Evidence from the flow of funds’, Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 16–34.
Christoffel, K. & Kuester, K. (2008), ‘Resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemploy-
ment fluctuations’, Journal of Monetary Economics 55(5), 865–887.
Clarida, R., Gali, J. & Gertler, M. (1999), ‘The science of monetary policy: A New Keynesian
perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature 37(4), 1661–1707.
Consolo, A. & Hertweck, M. S. (2010), Shocks and frictions under right-to-manage wage bar-
gaining: A transatlantic perspective, WWZ Discussion Papers No. 2010/01, Wirtschaftswis-
senschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel.
23
DiCecio, R. (2009), ‘Sticky wages and sectoral labor comovement’, Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control 33(3), 538–553.
Erceg, C. J., Henderson, D. W. & Levin, A. T. (2000), ‘Optimal monetary policy with staggered
wage and price contracts’, Journal of Monetary Economics 46(2), 281–313.
Erceg, C. & Levin, A. (2006), ‘Optimal monetary policy with durable consumption goods’,
Journal of Monetary Economics 53(7), 1341–1359.
Fraumeni, B. (1997), ‘The measurement of depreciation in the U.S. national income and product
accounts’, Survey of Current Business 77, 7–23.
Fujita, S. & Ramey, G. (2009), ‘The cyclicality of separation and job finding rates’, International
Economic Review 50(2), 415–430.
Gertler, M., Sala, L. & Trigari, A. (2008), ‘An estimated monetary DSGE model with unem-
ployment and staggered nominal wage bargaining’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
40(8), 1713–1764.
Gottschalk, P. (2005), ‘Downward nominal-wage flexibility: Real or measurement error?’, The
Review of Economics and Statistics 87(3), 556–568.
Haefke, C., Sonntag, M. & van Rens, T. (2009), Wage rigidity and job creation, Kiel Working
Paper No. 1504, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Hagedorn, M. & Manovskii, I. (2008), ‘The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies revisited’, American Economic Review 98(4), 1692–1706.
Hall, R. E. (2005), ‘Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness’, American Eco-
nomic Review 95(1), 50–65.
Hertweck, M. S. & Sigrist, O. (2012), The ins and outs of unemployment: A transatlantic
perspective, Unpublished manuscript, University of Basel & University of Konstanz.
Herz, B. & van Rens, T. (2011), Structural unemployment, Economics Working Papers No. 1276,
Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Iacoviello, M. (2005), ‘House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy in the business
cycle’, American Economic Review 95(3), 739–764.
Iacoviello, M. & Neri, S. (2010), ‘Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated dsge
model’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(2), 125–164.
Jorgenson, D. W. & Stiroh, K. J. (2000), ‘Raising the speed limit: U.S. economic growth in the
information age’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 31(1), 125–236.
Kambourov, G. & Manovskii, I. (2008), ‘Rising occupational and industry mobility in the United
States: 1968-97’, International Economic Review 49(1), 41–79.
Katayama, M. & Kim, K. H. (2010), Intertemporal substitution and sectoral comovement in
a sticky price model, Departmental Working Papers No. 2010-01, Department of Economics,
Louisiana State University.
Kitamura, T. & Takamura, T. (2008), Can sticky information solve comovement problem in
two-sector model with durable goods?, Unpublished manuscript, Bank of Japan.
Klenow, P. J. & Kryvtsov, O. (2008), ‘State-dependent or time-dependent pricing: Does it
matter for recent U.S. inflation?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(3), 863–904.
24
Krause, M. U. & Lubik, T. A. (2007), ‘The (ir)relevance of real wage rigidity in the New
Keynesian model with search frictions’, Journal of Monetary Economics 54(3), 706–727.
Levin, A. & Yun, T. (2011), Durable goods and persistent recession, Unpublished manuscript,
Federal Reserve Board.
MaCurdy, T. E. (1983), ‘A simple scheme for estimating an intertemporal model of labor supply
and consumption in the presence of taxes and uncertainty’, International Economic Review
24(2), 265–289.
Merz, M. (1995), ‘Search in the labor market and the real business cycle’, Journal of Monetary
Economics 36(2), 269–300.
Monacelli, T. (2009), ‘New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral constraints’, Journal
of Monetary Economics 56(2), 242–254.
Nash, J. (1953), ‘Two-person cooperative games’, Econometrica 21, 128–140.
Petrongolo, B. & Pissarides, C. A. (2001), ‘Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching
function’, Journal of Economic Literature 39(2), 390–431.
Petrongolo, B. & Pissarides, C. A. (2008), ‘The ins and outs of European unemployment’,
American Economic Review 98(2), 256–262.
Pissarides, C. (2000), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, MIT Press.
Ramey, V. A. (1991), Comment on "Markups and the business cycle" by michael woodford and
julio rotemberg, in O. J. Blanchard & S. Fischer, eds, ‘NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991’,
Vol. 6 of NBER Macroeconomics Annual, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 134–139.
Ravenna, F. &Walsh, C. E. (2008), ‘Vacancies, unemployment, and the Phillips curve’, European
Economic Review 52(8), 1494–1521.
Shimer, R. (2012), ‘Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment’, Review of Economic Dy-
namics 15(2), 127–148.
Sims, C. A. (1992), ‘Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts: The effects of monetary
policy’, European Economic Review 36(5), 975–1000.
Sterk, V. (2010), ‘Credit frictions and the comovement between durable and non-durable con-
sumption’, Journal of Monetary Economics 57(2), 217–225.
Taylor, J. B. (1993), ‘Discretion versus policy rules in practice’, Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy 39(1), 195–214.
Thomas, C. & Zanetti, F. (2009), ‘Labor market reform and price stability: An application to
the Euro Area’, Journal of Monetary Economics 56(6), 885–899.
Törnqvist, L. (1936), ‘The Bank of Finland’s consumption price index’, Bank of Finland Monthly
Bulletin 10, 1–8.
Trigari, A. (2006), The role of search frictions and bargaining for inflation dynamics, Working
Paper No. 304, Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research, Bocconi University.
Tsai, Y.-C. (2010), Two Essays on Macroeconomic Shocks and Economic Fluctuations, PhD
thesis, Ohio State University.
25
A The Log-Linearised Model
A.1 Main Equations
mˆt =
ξ
vc + vd
(vcvˆct + vdvˆdt) + (1− ξ) uˆt, (34)
ncnˆct − (1− ρc)ncnˆct−1 + ndnˆdt − (1− ρd)ndnˆdt−1 = mmˆt, (35)
vdnc [vˆdt + nˆct − (1− ρc) (vˆdt + nˆct−1)] = vcnd [vˆct + nˆdt − (1− ρd) (vˆct + nˆdt−1)] , (36)
uuˆt = − (1− ρc)ncnˆct−1 − (1− ρd)ndnˆdt−1, (37)
λˆt = (1− σ) ωˆt − cˆt, (38)
λˆt = Rˆt + Et
[
λˆt+1 − pˆict+1
]
, (39)
λˆt + ϕˆdt = [1− β (1− δ)]
[
(1− σ) ωˆt − dˆt
]
+ β (1− δ)Et
[
λˆt+1 + ϕˆdt+1
]
, (40)
ωˆt = ζcˆt + (1− ζ) dˆt, (41)
pˆict = βEt [pˆict+1] +
(1− βϑc) (1− ϑc)
ϑc
ϕˆwct, (42)
ϑdpˆidt = ϑdβEt [pˆidt+1] + (1− βϑd) (1− ϑd) (ϕˆwdt − ϕˆdt) , (43)
ϕˆdt − ϕˆdt−1 = pˆidt − pˆict, (44)
yˆct = nˆst + αchˆct, (45)
yˆdt = nˆdt + αdhˆdt, (46)
qˆt = (1− ξ)
[
uˆt − 1
vc + vd
(vcvˆct + vdvˆdt)
]
, (47)
wˆct = ϑ˜c (wˆct−1 − pˆict) +
(
1− ϑ˜c
)
wˆ∗ct, (48)
wˆdt = ϑ˜d (wˆdt−1 − pˆict) +
(
1− ϑ˜d
)
wˆ∗dt, (49)
ycyˆct = ccˆt + κcvcvˆct + κdvdvˆdt + µcncnˆct + µdndnˆdt, (50)
yyˆt = ycyˆct + ϕdyd (yˆdt + ϕˆdt) , (51)
Rˆt = rrRˆt−1 + (1− rr) rppˆict + (1− rr) ry yˆt + εrt, (52)
δyˆdt = dˆt − (1− δ) dˆt−1, (53)
θˆct = vˆct − uˆt, (54)
θˆdt = vˆdt − uˆt, (55)
− κc
q
qˆt =
ϑ˜cwchc
1− β (1− ρc) ϑ˜c
Et [wˆ∗ct + pˆict − wˆct−1] + JcJˆ ∗ct, (56)
− κd
q
qˆt =
ϑ˜dwdhd
1− β (1− ρd) ϑ˜d
Et [wˆ∗dt + pˆict − wˆdt−1] + βJdJˆ ∗dt. (57)
A.2 Nash Bargaining - Equations
ϕˆmct = (1− αc + %c) hˆct − λˆt, (58)
ϕˆmct = (1− αd + %d) hˆdt − λˆt, (59)
Jˆ ∗ct = Wˆ∗ct, (60)
Jˆ ∗dt = Wˆ∗dt, (61)
JcJˆ ∗ct =ϕmc zchc
(
ϕˆmct + αchˆct
)
− wchc
(
wˆ∗ct + hˆct
)
+ (62)
+ β (1− ρc) ϑ˜cwchc
1− β (1− ρc) ϑ˜c
Et [wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct] + +β (1− ρc)JcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Jˆ ∗ct+1
]
,
JdJˆ ∗dt =ϕmd zdhd
(
ϕˆmdt + αdhˆdt
)
− wdhd
(
wˆ∗dt + hˆdt
)
+ (63)
+ β (1− ρd) ϑ˜dwdhd
1− β (1− ρd) ϑ˜d
Et [wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt] + β (1− ρd)JdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Jˆ ∗dt+1
]
,
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WcWˆ∗ct =wchc
(
wˆ∗ct + hˆct
)
− χc h
1+%c
c
(1 + %c)λ
[
(1 + %c) hˆct − λˆt
]
+ (64)
+ βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
1− βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
wchcEt [wˆ∗ct − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct+1]−
− βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
1− βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
wchcqθcEt [wˆct − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct+1] +
+ βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
1− βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
wdhdqθdEt [wˆdt − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt+1] +
+ β (1− ρc) (1− q (θ) θc)WcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗ct+1
]
−
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆct+1
]
−
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗dt+1
]
−
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆdt+1
]
,
WdWˆ∗dt =wdhd
(
wˆ∗dt + hˆdt
)
− χd h
1+%d
d
(1 + %d)λ
[
(1 + %d) hˆdt − λˆt
]
+ (65)
+ βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
1− βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
wdhdEt [wˆ∗dt − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt+1]−
− βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
1− βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
wdhdqθdEt [wˆdt − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt+1] +
+ βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
1− βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
wchcqθcEt [wˆct − pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct+1] +
+ β (1− ρd) (1− q (θ) θd)WdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗dt+1
]
−
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆt+1
]
−
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗ct+1
]
−
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆct+1
]
.
A.3 Right-to-Manage Bargaining - Equations
ϕˆwct + (αc − 1) hˆct = wˆct, (66)
ϕˆwdt + (αd − 1) hˆdt = wˆdt, (67)
Jˆ ∗ct + ηˆwct = Wˆ∗ct + ηˆfct, (68)
Jˆ ∗dt + ηˆwdt = Wˆ∗dt + ηˆfdt, (69)
JcJˆ ∗ct =wchc
[
ϕˆwct
αc
− wˆ∗ct + β (1− ρc) ϑ˜c1− β (1− ρc) ϑ˜c
Et [wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct]
]
+ (70)
+ β (1− ρc)JcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Jˆ ∗ct+1
]
,
JdJˆ ∗dt =wdhd
[
ϕˆwdt
αd
− wˆ∗dt + β (1− ρd) ϑ˜d1− β (1− ρd) ϑ˜d
Et [wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt]
]
+ (71)
+ β (1− ρd)JdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Jˆ ∗dt+1
]
,
ηˆfct =
[
1− β (1− ρc) ϑ˜c
]
1− αc (ϕˆ
w
ct − αcwˆ∗ct)+ (72)
+ (1− ρc)βϑ˜cEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt +
(
αc
1− αc
)
(wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct) + ηˆfct+1
]
,
ηˆfdt =
[
1− β (1− ρd) ϑ˜d
]
1− αd (ϕˆ
w
dt − αdwˆ∗dt)+ (73)
+ (1− ρd)βϑ˜dEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt +
(
αd
1− αd
)
(wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt) + ηˆfdt+1
]
,
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ηwc ηˆ
w
ct =
[ 1 + %c
1− αc (ϕˆ
w
ct − wˆ∗ct)− λˆt
]
χc
λ
h1+%cc
1− αc −
αcwchc
(1− αc)2
(ϕˆwct − αcwˆ∗ct)+ (74)
+ βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
1− βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
[
(1 + %c)
(1− αc)2
χch
1+%c
c
λ
−
(
αc
1− αc
)2
wchc
]
Et [wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗ct] +
+ ηwc βϑ˜c (1− ρc)Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + ηˆwct+1
]
,
ηwd ηˆ
w
dt =
[ 1 + %d
1− αd (ϕˆ
w
dt − wˆ∗dt)− λˆt
]
χd
λ
h
1+%d
d
1− αd −
αdwdhd
(1− αd)2
(ϕˆwdt − αdwˆ∗dt)+ (75)
+ βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
1− βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
[
(1 + %d)
(1− αd)2
χdh
1+%d
d
λ
−
(
αd
1− αd
)2
wdhd
]
Et [wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆict+1 − wˆ∗dt] +
+ ηwd βϑ˜d (1− ρd)Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + ηˆwdt+1
]
,
WcWˆ∗ct = wchc1− αc (ϕˆ
m
ct − αcwˆ∗ct)− χc h
1+%c
c
(1 + %c)λ
[ 1 + %c
1− αc (ϕ
m
ct − wˆ∗ct)− λˆt
]
+ (76)
+ βϑ˜c (1− ρc)
{
f1cEt
[
αc
1− αc (wˆ
∗
ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆ∗ct)
]
− f2cEt
[ 1 + %c
1− αc (wˆ
∗
ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆ∗ct)
]}
− βϑ˜c (1− ρc) q (θ) θcEt
[
f1c
(
αc
1− αc (wˆ
∗
ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆct)
)
− 1 + %c1− αc f
2
c (wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆct)
]
− βϑ˜d (1− ρd) q (θ) θdEt
[
f1d
(
αd
1− αd (wˆ
∗
dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆdt)
)
− 1 + %d1− αd f
2
d (wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆdt)
]
+ β (1− ρc) (1− q (θ) θc)WcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗ct+1
]
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆct+1
]
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗dt+1
]
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆdt+1
]
,
WdWˆ∗dt = wdhd1− αd (ϕˆ
m
dt − αdwˆ∗dt)− χd
h
1+%d
d
(1 + %d)λ
[ 1 + %d
1− αd (ϕ
m
dt − wˆ∗dt)− λˆt
]
+ (77)
+ βϑ˜d (1− ρd)
{
f1dEt
[
αd
1− αd (wˆ
∗
dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆ∗dt)
]
− f2dEt
[ 1 + %d
1− αd (wˆ
∗
dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆ∗dt)
]}
− βϑ˜d (1− ρd) q (θ) θdEt
[
f1d
(
αd
1− αd (wˆ
∗
dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆdt)
)
− 1 + %d1− αd f
2
d (wˆ∗dt+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆdt)
]
− βϑ˜c (1− ρc) q (θ) θcEt
[
f1c
(
αc
1− αl (wˆ
∗
ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆct)
)
− 1 + %c1− αc f
2
c (wˆ∗ct+1 + pˆit+1 − wˆct)
]
+ β (1− ρd) (1− q (θ) θd)WdEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗dt+1
]
− β (1− ρd) q (θ) θdWdEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆdt+1
]
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + Wˆ∗ct+1
]
− β (1− ρc) q (θ) θcWcEt
[
qˆt+1 + θˆct+1
]
,
with f1c = wchc1−βϑ˜c(1−ρc) and f
2
c = χch
1+%c
(1+%c)λ[1−βϑ˜c(1−ρc)] and f
1
d = wdhd1−βϑ˜d(1−ρd) and f
2
d = χdh
1+%d
(1+%d)λ[1−βϑ˜d(1−ρd)] .
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B Tables
B.1 Sources and Definitions of Data
Series Definition Source Mnemonic
NGd nominal durable goods BEA Table 1.1.5
NGn nominal non-durable goods BEA Table 1.1.5
NGs nominal services BEA Table 1.1.5
NGi nominal residential investment BEA Table 1.1.5
PDd price deflator, durable goods BEA Table 1.1.9
PDn price deflator, non-durable goods BEA Table 1.1.9
PDs price deflator, services BEA Table 1.1.9
PDi price deflator, residential investment BEA Table 1.1.9
WAs hourly earnings, services BLS CES0800000008
WAc hourly earnings, construction BLS CES2000000008
WAd hourly earnings, durable goods BLS CES3100000008
WAn hourly earnings, non-durable goods BLS CES3200000008
HOs weekly hours, services BLS CES0800000007
HOc weekly hours, construction BLS CES2000000007
HOd weekly hours, durable goods BLS CES3100000007
HOn weekly hours, non-durable goods BLS CES3200000007
EMs employees, services BLS CES0800000006
EMc employees, construction BLS CES2000000006
EMd employees, durable goods BLS CES3100000006
EMn employees, non-durable goods BLS CES3200000006
POP civilian non-institutional population 16+ FRED CNP16OV
FFR effective Federal Funds rate FRED FEDFUNDS
Table 1: This table displays the definitions of the raw series used. The monthly series are aggregated to quarterly
data. All time series are seasonally adjusted (where applicable). We define the durable sector (D) as the sum
of durable goods (d) and residential investment (i) when using BEA data and the sum of durable goods (d) and
construction (c) when using BSL data, respectively. Accordingly, the non-durable sector (N) is defined as the
sum of the non-durable goods (n) and services (s) in both databases used (BEA, BLS). We then use nominal
quantity series and price deflators to compute real Törnqvist (1936) quantity indices (QIN , QID).
B.2 Definition of Variables in the SVAR
Variable Symbol Definition
relative price of durable goods ∆pdt log of (PDD/PDN )
relative wage of workers in the durable sector ∆wdt log of (WAD/WAN )
inflation rate in the non-durable sector pit first difference of log (PDC)
employment rate in the non-durable sector nct log of (EMN/POP )
employment rate in the durable sector ndt log of (EMD/POP )
hours per worker in the non-durable sector hct log of (HOC)
hours per worker in the durable sector hdt log of (HOD)
output per capita in the non-durable sector yct log of (QIN/POP )
output per capita in the durable sector ydt log of (QID/POP )
Federal Funds rate rt FFR
Table 2: This table displays the variables that enter the SVAR.
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Table 3: Parameter Values - Baseline Calibration
Description Parameter Value
Preferences
discount factor β 0.99
inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution σ 1
weight of non-durable goods in the utility function ζ 0.76
share of non-durable goods in consumption (implied) c/(c+ ϕyd) 0.81
elasticity of substitution between varieties s 11
labour supply elasticity along the intensive margin %s 2.8
hours per worker (normalisation) hs 1
utility cost of working time (implied) χs 0.79
Production and Technology
durable depreciation rate δ 0.025
Firm-Worker Matches
non-labour cost of production µs 0.54
labour input expenditure share (implied) wshs/(wshs + µs) 0.40
production elasticity of labour (implied) αs 0.40
nom./eff. bargaining power of the rep. household γs, γ∗s 0.5
Search in the Labour Market
aggregate unemployment rate (implied) 1− nc − nd 0.06
separation rate ρs 0.10
vacancy posting cost κs 0.07
efficiency of the matching function m¯ 0.95
unemployment benefits b¯ 0.24
ratio of vacancy posting costs to aggregate output (implied) (κv)/y 0.005
total replacement ratio (implied) (b¯+ l¯)/w 0.91
aggregate job searchers (implied) ut 0.15
job finding rate (implied) p(θ) 0.61
matching elasticity of vacancies ξ 0.5
Price and Wage Stickiness
Calvo price stickiness in sector c ϑc 0.7
Calvo price stickiness in sector d ϑd 0
Calvo wage stickiness (symmetric across sectors) ϑ˜s 0.4
Monetary Policy
monetary policy inertia µr 0.8
monetary policy responsiveness to inflation rp 2.0
monetary policy responsiveness to the output gap ry 0.3
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the Cholesky orthogonalised impulse responses to a contractionary monetary
policy shock. The blue solid line is the point estimate. The red dashed lines represents the two standard error
confidence band.
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Figure 2: The figure illustrates the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Right-
to-Manage bargaining. The blue solid line represents the flexible wage regime. The red dashed line represents the
sticky wage regime (with ϑ = 0.4).
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Figure 3: The figure illustrates the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Nash
bargaining. The blue solid line represents the flexible wage regime. The red dashed line represents the sticky
wage regime (with ϑ = 0.4).
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Figure 4: The figure illustrates the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under different
degrees of cross-sectoral labour mobility. The blue solid line represents the model with perfect cross-sectoral
labour mobility. The red dashed line represents the model where labour is sector-specific. Nominal wages are
sticky under both model versions (with ϑ = 0.4).
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Figure 5: The figure illustrates the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under two
different model parameterisations. The blue solid line represents the model when αs = 0.65. The red dashed line
represents the model when α = 0.45. Nominal wages are sticky under both model versions (with ϑ = 0.4).
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